This paper extends Woodford's (2010) approach to the robustly monetary policy to a general linear quadratic framework. We provide algorithms to solve for a time-invariant linear robustly optimal policy from a timeless perspective and for a time-invariant linear Markov perfect equilibrium under discretion. We apply our methods to a New Keynesian model of monetary policy with persistent cost-push shocks and inflation inertia. We find that the robustly optimal commitment inflation is less responsive to a cost-push shock when the shock is more persistent and that the robustly optimal discretionary policy is more responsive to lagged inflation in the presence inflation inertia.
Introduction
The traditional policy analysis has been typically conducted under the rational expectations hypothesis. While we have learned a lot of lessons from this hypothesis, there are several good reasons for us to think about departures from this hypothesis. First, the Ellsberg (1961) paradox and related experimental evidence demonstrate that there is a distinction between risk and ambiguity. Risk refers to the situation where there is a known probability distribution over the state of the world, while ambiguity refers to the situation where the information is too vague to be adequately summarized by a single probability distribution. As a result, a decision maker may have multiple priors in mind (Gilboa an Schmeidler (1989) ). Second, as Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2003) and Sargent (2001, 2008) point out, economic agents view economic models as an approximation to the true model. They believe that economic data come from an unknown member of a set of unspecified models near the approximating model.
Concern about model misspecification induces a decision maker to want robust decision rules that work over that set of nearby models. 1 The above arguments are especially relevant for policy analysis in which uncertainty and expectations play an important role. Either the policymaker or the private agents may not have complete confidence in the likelihood of the state of the world and hence face model ambiguity.
Several possibilities may arise. 2 First, the policymaker does not trust its approximating model, but the private agents trust this model. The policymaker forms expectations using a model in a set of nearby models surrounding its approximating model. Hansen and Sargent (2003) and (2008, Chapter 16 ) study this case. Woodford (2010) studies a second case in which the policymaker trusts its approximating model, but the private agents do not trust this model.
The policymaker thinks that the private agents may form expectations using any model in a set of nearby models surrounding the policymaker's approximating model. The Hansen-Sargent approach seems well understood and several computation algorithms in the linear-quadratic framework have been proposed in the literature (e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2008) , Giordani and Soderlind (2008) , Dennis (2008) , Leitemo, and Soderstrom (2009) ). However, little is known about how to conduct robust policy analysis using the Woodford approach in a general linear-quadratic framework.
The present paper fills this gap by proposing algorithms for solving robustly optimal policy under both timeless perspective commitment and under discretion. Our algorithms borrow 1 There is a growing literature on the applications of robustness and ambiguity to finance and macroeconomics, e.g., Epstein and Wang (1994) , Hansen (2007) , and Ju and Miao (2012) , among others.
2 See Hansen and Sargent (2012) for a discussion of different types of ambiguity.
insights from Woodford (2010) , who derives analytical solutions for a basic New Keynesian model. We focus on conditionally linear policy rules under timeless perspective commitment and linear Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) under discretion. We show that robustly optimal conditionally linear policy and a linear Markov perfect equilibrium can exist given certain conditions. Our algorithms then reduce to solving for linear decision rules using tools from the literature on solving linear rational expectations models and linear-quadratic control problems.
We apply our algorithms to a New Keynesian model with persistent cost-push shock and inflation persistence. The Woodford (2010) model is a special case of our model. We confirm Woodford's (2010) major findings for the case of purely temporary shocks that (i) the robustly optimal inflation is less responsive to the current cost-push shock, and (ii) the robustly optimal inflation is more history dependent, compared to the case of rational expectations. We also find some new comparative statics results: (i) When the cost-push shock becomes more persistent, robustly optimal inflation is less responsive to a cost-push shock, but the robustly optimal output gap is more responsive. By contrast, optimal inflation under rational expectations is more responsive to a cost-push shock when it is more persistent.
(ii) In addition, the robust discretionary policy becomes more costly and the range of parameters for the existence of a linear MPE shrinks. (iii) When the steady state is more inefficient, the robustly optimal inflation is less responsive to the cost-push shock.
As Woodford (2010) points out, the central bank is not willing to let inflation increase in response to a positive cost-push shock when it is faced with a concern for robustness. The central bank fears that a large shock in inflation might affect the inflation expectation of private agents unfavorably to the central bank and thus the output-inflation trade-off might get worse if it allows inflation to increase. Naturally, the central bank's concern for the unfavorable change in the private agents' forecast becomes larger, when the cost-push shock is more persistent.
As a result, the central bank is more conservative in setting the optimal inflation rate. If the shock is as highly persistent as a unit root process, the central bank commits to an inflation rate which does not depend on the current shock.
In our model, the New Keynesian Phillips curve contains lagged inflation. The lagged inflation rate is an endogenous state variable and hence the method in Woodford (2010) cannot be applied. Using our algorithms, we also find the following new results: (i) When the degree of inflation inertia is larger, the sensitivities to the contemporaneous cost-push shock of both the robustly optimal commitment and discretionary policies are closer to those under rational expectations. In this case, the impact of the belief distortion from the private sector is smaller as a smaller weight is attached to the expected inflation.
(ii) The robustly optimal discretionary policy is more sensitive to lagged inflation than the optimal discretionary policy under rational expectations. This sensitivity increases as the volatility of the cost-push shock increases. This is in contrast to the case of rational expectations under which the optimal discretionary inflation responds to lagged inflation by the same degree regardless of the size of the shock volatility.
The intuition is that without commitment, the inflation bias is even stronger in the case of concerns for robustness than in the case of rational expectations. Under the worst-case beliefs, inflation expectations are biased upward and hence a discretionary central bank has a greater incentive to respond to both the current shock and lagged inflation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the general framework.
Section 3 presents an algorithm for solving robustly optimal policy in a timeless perspective.
Section 4 provides an algorithm for solving robustly optimal discretionary policy. Section 5 analyzes a monetary policy example. Section 6 concludes. Technical details are relegated to appendices.
A Linear-Quadratic Framework

Uncertainty and Beliefs
Uncertainty is generated by a stochastic process of shocks {ε t } ∞ t=0 where ε t is an n ε × 1 vector of independently and identically distributed standard normal random variable. Let ε t = {ε 0 , ε 1 , ..., ε t } . At date t, both the policymaker and the private sector have common information generated by ε t and some initial state x 0 . They may not have rational expectations in that their subjective beliefs may not coincide with the objective probability distribution governing exogenous shocks {ε t } ∞ t=0 . One reason is that economic agents view their model as an approximation and thus may be concerned about model misspecification.
Model misspecification is described by a perturbation to the distribution of shocks. Let p (ε) denote the standard normal density of ε t . Let P and P t denote the induced distribution over the full state space and the induced joint distribution of ε t , respectively. Assume that a distorted distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the reference distribution P. We can then represent belief distortions by Radon-Nikodym derivatives.
Letp
( ε|ε t , x 0 ) denote an alternative one-step-ahead density for ε t+1 conditioned on date t information. Form the likelihood ratio or the Radon-Nikodym derivative for one-step-ahead distributions:
It satisfies the property
where E t denotes the conditional expectation operator for the reference distribution P given date t information. Inspired by Sargent (2001, 2008) , Woodford (2010) 
Model ambiguity is described by a set of one-step-ahead densities {m t } ∞ t=1 satisfying the constraint:
for some η 0 > 0.
Robustly Optimal Policy Problem
Suppose that the equilibrium system from the private sector can be summarized by the following form:
where x 0 is exogenously given andÊ t denotes the conditional expectation operator given date t information based on the common beliefs of the private sector. The private sector's beliefs may not coincide with the "objective" probability distribution for {ε t } , the reference distribution P. Here x t is an n x × 1 vector of predetermined variables in the sense defined in Klein (2000) , All matrices in (4) are conformable. For simplicity, we suppose that the matrix on the left side of equation (4) is invertible, 3 so that we can multiply both sides of this equation by its inverse to obtain the system:
where we used the shorthand notation
, and we partitioned matrices conformably.
The policymaker has the period loss function,
where we assume the matrix   
is symmetric and positive semidefinite.
If both the private sector and the policymaker have rational expectations, then they have common beliefs which coincide with P, the probability distribution governing exogenous shocks {ε t } . In this case, the optimal policy problem with commitment is given by max {xt,yt,ut}
subject to (5) in which the conditional expectation operatorÊ t is equal to E t , the conditional expectation operator with respect to P.
3 The singular case can be handled by the QZ decomposition method, e.g., Klein (2000) and Sims (2002) .
Following Woodford (2010), we suppose that the policymaker has a single model of the exogenous processes {ε t } and thus no ambiguity along this dimension. Nevertheless, the policymaker faces ambiguity because it knows only that the private sector's model is within a set of probability models surrounding its own model. The policymaker evaluates the private sector's forward-looking equation using a worst-case model and solves the following problem:
subject to (1) and
Here the parameter θ > 0 penalizes one-step-ahead densities {m t } with large relative entropies defined in (2). It may be regarded as the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (3). Following Sargent (2001, 2008) , instead of solving for the constraint problem subject to (3), we treat θ as a parameter, which measures the policymaker's degree of concern for possible departures from rational expectations, with a small value of θ implying a great degree of concern for robustness, while a large value of θ implies that only modest departures from rational expectations are considered plausible. When θ → ∞, the rational expectations analysis is obtained as a limiting case.
Commitment in a Timeless Perspective
Instead of solving for an optimal commitment policy, 4 Woodford (2010) uses a timeless perspective to derive a closed-form solution to a robustly optimal monetary policy problem in a simple New Keynesian model. We now extend his idea to our general formulation. We replace E 0 in (7) with E −1 , the conditional expectation operator given the economy's state at date −1, i.e., before the realization of the period zero state x 0 or implied ε 0 . Instead of supposing that the policymaker chooses a sequence of (possibly time-varying) {y t } for all t ≥ 0, we consider only the problem of choosing an optimal sequence of commitments {y t } for periods t ≥ 1, taking as given a commitment y 0 that the policymaker must fulfill.
Suppose that the initial commitment takes a linear form: Kwon and Miao (2012) study this type of policy in models with three types of ambiguity.
for some coefficients (Φ −1 , Γ −1 ) . Suppose that {y t } chosen for periods t ≥ 1 may depend on (Φ −1 , Γ −1 ) and shocks from periods zero through t. We focus on conditionally linear rules of the following form:
where Φ t is stochastic and measurable with respect to date t information and Γ t is deterministic.
For any initial commitment (
, and {u t } t≥0 to solve problem (7).
To define optimal policy from a timeless perspective, suppose that Φ −1 is drawn from some
Ramsey policy is such that (i) Γ t = Γ −1 and (ii) the unconditional distribution of ρ t for Φ t is equal to ρ, for each t ≥ 0. Our goal is to solve for a conditionally linear robustly optimal policy with a self-consistent initial commitment. 5
Form the Lagrangian expression:
are vectors of Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (1) and (8), respectively. Note that µ xt+1 is measurable with respect to date t + 1 information and corresponds to x t+1 , but µ yt is measurable with respect to date t information and corresponds to y t .
The first-order conditions with respect to m t+1 is given by
Substituting the linear form in (9) into the above equation yields:
Since Γ t , Φ t , µ yt , ϕ t are measurable with respect to the date t information, m t+1 follows a log-normal distribution conditioned on date t information. Using equation (1), we can show that the worst-case density is given by
This implies that under the worst-case belief, the shock ε t follows a normal distribution with mean θ −1 Γ ′ t µ yt and covariance matrix I. Under the worst-case belief, the conditional expectation of y t+1 is given by
and the conditional relative entropy is given by
Since E t y t+1 = Φ t , it follows that, relative to the policymaker's expectations, the worst-case beliefs distort the private agents' expectations by θ −1 Γ t Γ ′ t µ yt . Now substitute equations (13) and (14) into the Lagrangian to obtain
The first-order conditions with respect to x t , u t , Φ t , and Γ t are given by 6
6 For any scalar function f (X) of a n × k matrix X = (xij), we define the derivative
...
Plugging (9), (13) and (14) into (8) yields:
Since we focus on self-consistent optimal policy, we assume that Γ t = Γ for all t. We start with an initial guess of Γ and then solve for
Equations (15), (16), (17), (19), and (20) together with two identity equations E t ε t+1 = 0 and E t µ xt+1 = E t µ xt+1 form a linear system of the following form:
where
Here ε t , x t and Φ t−1 are predetermined variables, and u t , µ yt , µ xt and E t µ xt+1 are nonpredetermined variables. 7 Adapting a standard method for solving linear rational expectations models (e.g., Klein (2000)), we can show in Appendix A that the solution takes the following state space representation: 8
and
where the first row of M contains zero elements.
For Φ t to have an invariant distribution, (22) should be a stationary process, which can be satisfied if M has all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. We assume this condition is satisfied.
After deriving the state space representation, we can derive an updated value for Γ using (18). When θ is finite, the presence of the term β (18) implies that the solution for Γ may be time varying. The timeless perspective discussed in Woodford (2010) solves this issue. Since the optimal policy in the timeless perspective should satisfy (18) for every realization of the initial commitment, Φ −1 , we can take unconditional expectations on 7 In our solution the non-predetermined variable yt in the equilibrium system from the private sector is rewritten using predetermined variables (Φt−1, εt) . Thus, the Lagrange multiplier µ yt associated with yt becomes a non-predetermined variable.
8 Note that the system in (21) does not fit exactly in Klein's (2000) general form.
both sides of (18) to derive 9
where we have assumed that the inverse exists. In Appendix B, we derive formulas for comput-
, and E [u t ϵ ′ t ]. The above equation gives an updated solution for Γ denoted byΓ. IfΓ is sufficiently close to Γ, stop. Otherwise, useΓ to replace Γ and repeat the above procedure until convergence. We are unable to give a condition to guarantee convergence. But this algorithm works well for all examples studied in this paper.
From the above analysis, we find that the robustness parameter θ appears explicitly in two terms only: one is −θ −1 ΓΓ ′ in the matrix F and the other is θ
In the limiting case θ → ∞, both terms vanish and the solution converges to the rational expectations case. When θ is smaller, the impact of robustness is larger. In addition, the impact of robustness on Γ depends on the moment
for any fixed finite value of θ.
These observations are important for understanding the intuition behind the examples analyzed later.
Robust Discretionary Policy
To understand the value and importance of policy commitment, we now study robust discretionary policy. In this case, the policymaker reoptimizes every period by taking the private agents expectations about future policy as given. We shall focus on Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). A robust MPE consists of time-invariant functions f (x t ) and V (x t ) such that given
, V (x t ) and y t = f (x t ) solve the following Bellman equation:
subject to (1) and (8).
We focus on linear solutions for f in that
for some matrix G to be determined. Adapting the method from the rational expectations analysis (e.g., Backus and Driffil (1986) and Soderlind (1999) ), we use an iterative procedure to find G by backward induction. Specifically, let
where G t+1 is a deterministic matrix. Substituting this expression into the forward-looking equation in (8) and rewrite the Bellman equation (25) as
We can show that the first-order condition with respect to m t+1 is given by (10), where ϕ t and µ yt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (1) and the forward-looking equation in (8). Using equations (1), (26), (10), (8), we can show that
) .
It follows that m t+1 follows a log-normal distribution conditioned on date t information. We can then compute
where we define
, the worst-case beliefs distort the private agents' expectations by Λ t+1 µ yt , relative to the policymaker's expectations.
Substituting (30) into (8) yields:
Conjecture that
where J t is a deterministic matrix and v t is a deterministic constant. Substituting the conjec-ture, (29), and into (28) yields:
) , subject to (31) and
where the Lagrange multiplier µ yt is associated with (31). The above problem is a standard linear quadratic control problem with state variable x t and control variables u t and y t . In Appendix C, we solve for J t , v t and linear decision rules of the following form:
To find the time-invariant functions, we start with an initial guess of a positive semi-definite matrix J t+1 , a constant v t+1 , and any matrix G t+1 . We then obtain the updated constant v t and matrices J t and G t . Iterating this process until convergence gives J and G in a Markov perfect equilibrium. In addition, v t converges to v in the value function and F t converges to F which gives the stationary policy rule. Note that since a MPE is a fixed point, there may be multiple equilibria or no equilibrium. For the simple New Keynesian model, Woodford (2010) provides explicit characterizations. But a similar characterization for our general model is not available.
Applications to Monetary Policy
In this section, we apply our general theory to the study of robustly optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model. The central bank's loss function is given by
where π t denotes the inflation rate, x t denotes the output gap, and x * ≥ 0 denotes the target output gap. The value of x * measures the degree of inefficiency of the steady state. If x * = 0, the steady state is efficient. The parameter λ measures the weight to the output gap. The two models differ in the specification of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Empirical studies find evidence that inflation is persistent. 10 Suppose that the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is given by
where η ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of backward-looking behavior exhibited by inflation. 11
Assume that κ > 0 and {z t } follows an AR(1) process:
where ρ z ∈ (0, 1) and σ z > 0. When η = 0, the model reduces to the basic New Keynesian model studied by Woodford (2010) . When η ∈ (0, 1), Woodford's (2010) analytical method does not apply because the lagged inflation rate provides another state variable.
Timeless Perspective Commitment
The robustly optimal policy problem with commitment is given by
subject to (34). To solve this problem using our general framework, we define a new predetermined state variable as k t+1 ≡ π t and rewrite (34) as
To map to our general framework, k t and z t constitute the predetermined vector x t , π t is the forward-looking variable y t , and x t is the control variable u t . Assume that the central bank commits to a policy in the form
10 See, e.g., Fuhrer (1996) . 11 See, e.g, Gali and Gertler (1999) for a microfounded model with this feature.
Let µ πt denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (38). As in Section 3, we can show that the worst-case belief satisfies
Since E t π t+1 = Φ t , θ −1 Γ 2 t µ πt represents the distortion of the private agents' expectations relative to the central bank's. We can then use our algorithm developed in Section 3 to solve for a robustly optimal policy with timeless perspective commitment.
We set baseline parameter values for β, κ, λ, and x * as Woodford (2010): β = 0.99, κ = 0.2, λ = 0.08, x * = 0.05. 12 We first set η = 0 and ρ z = 0. The first panel of Figure 1 replicates the result in Woodford (2010) . We confirm his result that when the central bank is more concerned for robustness, it is more conservative and inflation responds less to the cost-push shock in the sense that Γ decreases with 1/θ. In addition, Γ decreases more than proportionally with σ z .
This implies that certainty-equivalence does not apply to the robustly optimal case. Notably, Γ decreases with σ z for large values of σ z when ρ z is sufficiently large. When the cost-push shock is sufficiently persistent as much as ρ z = 0.95, robustly optimal Γ is almost independent of σ z , as illustrated in the second panel of Figure 1 . The middle two panels of this figure shows the impact of ρ z for σ z = 0.02 and 0.04. Under rational expectations, Γ is an increasing function of ρ z , which can be easily verified analytically. When robustness matters, however, this relation does not apply. For low values of σ z , e.g., σ z = 0.02, Γ first increases with ρ z and then decreases to zero. If the concern for robustness is very high, e.g., θ = 0.001, Γ decreases with ρ z for high σ z , e.g., σ z = 0.04. In the limiting case, Γ = 0 if the cost-push shock process is a unit root process (i.e., ρ z = 1) for all θ < ∞.
As Woodford (2010) points out, the central bank is not willing to let inflation increase in response to a positive cost-push shock when it is faced with a concern for robustness. The central bank fears that a large shock in inflation might affect the private agents' inflation expectations unfavorably to the central bank and thus the output-inflation trade-off might get worse if it allows inflation to increase. Naturally, the central bank's concern for the unfavorable change in the agent's forecast becomes larger, when the cost-push shock is more persistent. As a result, the central bank is more conservative in setting the optimal inflation rate. If the shock is as highly persistent as a unit root process, the central bank commits to an inflation rate which does not depend on the current shock.
The bottom two panels of Figure 1 shows the impact of inflation persistence η. For simplicity, 12 There is a typo in Woodford (2010) . Parameter values of κ and x * in his paper should be interchanged to replicate the figures in his paper. we assume that the cost-push shock does not exhibit persistence, i.e., ρ z = 0. In the rational expectations case (i.e., θ = ∞), Γ increases with η until η = 0.5 then decreases. The shape of Γ shows a symmetry around η = 0.5. As the degree of concern for robustness increases, i.e., θ decreases, Γ also decreases for a fixed η. The degree of decrease in Γ is larger when η is smaller. This is because the impact of the concern for robustness increases when the weight on the inflation expectation is larger (i.e., η is smaller) in the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
In then limiting case when η = 1, inflation is completely determined one period ahead so that the central bank's doubt about the private sector's expectations does not change the optimal policy for inflation. Accordingly, the shape of Γ is not symmetric any more. Also note that for a given value of η the optimal value of Γ decreases increasingly as σ z increases. 
Figure 2: Impulse responses to a purely temporary positive cost-push shock with η = 0.3 and σ z = 0.02. The inflation expectation is with respect to the worst-case beliefs of the private agents. Figure 2 presents the dynamics of inflation, the worst-case inflation expectation, output gap, and prices in response to a purely temporary one-standard-deviation cost-push shock. For a moderate degree of inflation inertia (η = 0.3), the impulse responses exhibit very similar dynamics for both the rational expectations equilibrium and the robustly optimal equilibrium.
The intuition is that the impact of the belief distortion from the private sector is small since a small weight η = 0.7 is attached to the expected inflation. We also find that the long-run inflation rate is small but positive for both the rational expectations and robustness cases. The intuition is that in the presence of inflation inertia, the change in current inflation does not move future expected inflation one for one as it is attached a weight less than one. The central bank has an incentive to increase inflation to raise the output gap given x * > 0. The robustly optimal long-run output gap is still negative, which follows from the fact the long-run worst-case inflation expectations of the private agents are positive, worsening the inflation-output tradeoff.
We emphasize that the impact of robustness also depends on the efficiency of the steady state as reflected by the value of x * . This is because the Lagrange multiplier µ πt associated with NKPC (34) increases with x * by the following first-order condition with respect to x t ,
This result has two consequences as revealed by Figure 2 . First, x * biases the inflation expectation upward by (40). Thus, the steady-state output gap is negative even though the steady-state inflation rate is zero. Second,
] also increases with x * . As we have discussed in the end of Section 3, this implies that Γ decreases with x * for a finite θ (see (24)). Thus, under robustly optimal monetary policy the central bank will be more conservative in raising inflation in response to a positive cost-push shock when the economy is more inefficient. This result is in sharp contrast to that in the rational expectations case. Under rational expectations, the level of x * does not affect Γ. It only affects the steady-state inflation.
Discretion
We define z t and k t = π t−1 as the state variables and use the algorithm described in Section 4 to solve for a linear MPE of the form:
where G 0 is a constant and G 1 and G 2 measure the sensitivities of inflation to z t and π t−1 , respectively.
As we show earlier, the inflation inertia in the New Keynesian Phillips curve reduces the effect of inflation expectations and hence the effect of a concern for robustness on the optimal policy. This fact also applies to the discretionary policy with a concern for robustness. Figure   3 shows the effect of η numerically. When the degree of inflation inertia is strong enough (e.g. η = 0.5), we find that the gap between the sensitivities of optimal policy to cost-push shocks under discretion and under commitment decreases as η increases. In addition, as the inertia of inflation becomes stronger, the range for which a linear MPE can exist also increases.
Figure 3 exhibits how a discretionary policy responds to lagged inflation for different values of σ z . When the central bank has a doubt about its knowledge about inflation expectations of the private sector, the optimal discretionary policy is more sensitive to lagged inflation. The sensitivity increases as the volatility σ z of the cost-push shock increases. This is in contrast to the case of rational expectations under which optimal inflation responds to lagged inflation by the same degree regardless of the size of σ z . Furthermore, as the central bank is more concerned about robustness, the sensitivity to the lagged inflation of a discretionary policy becomes larger.
The intuition behind the above results is that without commitment, the inflation bias is even stronger in the case of concerns for robustness than in the case of rational expectations.
Under the worst-case beliefs, inflation expectations are biased upward and hence a discretionary central bank has a greater incentive to respond to both the current shock and lagged inflation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented algorithms for solving robust policy problems in a general linear-quadratic framework by extending the Woodford (2010) approach. We have applied our algorithms to a New Keynesian model. Our algorithms are based on a linear-quadratic framework, which has been applied widely for policy analysis. One may wonder whether this framework can be justified by a microfounded model. This question seems not obvious with concerns for robustness, though this issue is well understood under rational expectations (e.g., Woodford (2003) ). Adam and Woodford (2012) present a fully microfounded model and show that the linear-quadratic model of Woodford (2010) can be microfounded. This paper only focuses on the Woodford approach to robust policy. As Hansen and Sargent (2012) point out, there are other types of ambiguity for policy analysis. It would be interesting to study these types of ambiguity in the general linear-quadratic framework. We leave this study to Kwon and Miao (2012) .
A State Space Representation of the Solution
We adapt Klein's (2000) method to derive the solution in (22) and (23). His method cannot be directly applied since the system in (21) does not fit in his general form. Apply a QZ decomposition to matrices J and F. There exist square complex matrices Q, S, T and Z such that
where Z H denotes the transpose of the complex conjugate of Z. Q and Z are unitary (i.e.,
, and S and T are upper triangular (see Golub and van Loan (1996) ).
The decomposition can be reordered so that the block corresponding to the stable generalized eigenvalues (the ith diagonal element of T divided by the corresponding element in S) comes first. Define auxiliary variables
where k t corresponds to the predetermined variables ε t , x t and Φ t−1 , and λ t corresponds to the non-predetermined variables u t , µ yt , µ xt , and E t µ xt+1 . Premultiplying (21) by Q H , using (A.1), and partitioning S and T conformably, we can derive
We solve for a stable solution to the above system, which requires that the number of stable generalized eigenvalues be equal to the number of predetermined variables. We rule out the case of generalized eigenvalues with unitary modulus. Thus, the lower right block contains the unstable generalized eigenvalues. It follows that λ t = 0 for all t. We can then write remaining equations in the above system as
where S kk is invertible by our ordering of the matrix S.
Premultiplying both sides of (A.1) by Z yields:
where we have used the fact that λ t = 0. Suppose that Z kk is invertible. It follows that
Substituting the above equation into (A.3) yields:
Premultiplying by Z kk and using the law of iterated expectations, we obtain
Using equations (A.4) and (A.5) yields:
Using (5), we then obtain the solution in the form of (22) and (23). ] is the second row of N. We can compute that
B Computing Unconditional Moments
Finally, we use (23) to compute the unconditional moments:
We then obtain the moments
, and E [u t ε ′ t ] . 
C Computing Discretionary Policy
Note that we have defined
and assumed that it is invertible. After plugging (C.4) and (C.5) into (31) and solving for y t , we can derive the policy rule for period t as y t = G t x t , where
] ,
We also have to assume that ∆ t+1 is invertible. Substituting y t = G t x t into (C.4) yields: Substituting y t = G t x t , (C.5), and (C.6) for y t , µ yt and u t into the above equation, we can show that
Matching constant terms in (32) yields:
